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Notes and Comments
Bichler v. Lilly: Applying Concerted Action
To The DES Cases
I. Introduction
In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' a unanimous New York Court
of Appeals affirmed a lower-court ruling" which held that a
plaintiff may bring an action for damages against a drug manu-
facturer without being able to identify such manufacturer as the
actual maker of the drug which caused her injury.3 The Court of
Appeals decision, which accepted an expanded concerted action
theory as the basis of liability,4 removes a major obstacle faced
by many of the "DES daughters," the victims of the synthetic
estrogen ingested by their mothers when pregnant.6 Due to the
generic nature of the drug and the length of time between inges-
1. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
2. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1981).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The appellate court variously refers to the theory
as concert of action and concerted action. Id. The principle of the theory, according to
Prosser, is that:
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act,
actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or
encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their bene-
fit, are equally liable with him.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
The Bichler case expanded the theory by -allowing a showing of conscious parallel activ-
ity to fulfill the requirement of agreement. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
5. Many commentators use the phrase "DES daughters." See, e.g., Note, A Remedy
for the "DES Daughters": Products Liability Without the Identification Requirement,
42 U. Pirr. L. REv. 669 (1981).
6. DES, or diethylstilbestrol, is a synthetic estrogen which was used in treating com-
plications of pregnancy from 1947 to 1971. Daughters of women who used the drug, hav-
ing been exposed in utero, developed cancerous and pre-cancerous abnormalities of the
reproductive tract after onset of puberty. For a thorough discussion of the subject of
DES litigation, see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Comment].
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tion by the mother and manifestation of injury in the daughter,
most victims have been unable to identify the maker of the drug
which injured them. Without such identification, they fail to
prove a crucial element of the traditional tort requirement of
showing cause in fact,8 and therefore have been precluded from
seeking a remedy for an otherwise justiciable claim.9 Although
the narrowness of its ruling throws some doubt on the preceden-
tial value of the case, the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing
plaintiffs to circumvent the identification requirement, marks a
significant development in products liability law.
The plaintiff in Bichler brought an action against Eli Lilly,
a DES manufacturer, for damages sustained by her as a result of
her mother's ingestion of DES when pregnant with plaintiff.10
Diagnosed as having vaginal and cervical cancer at age seven-
teen, 1 plaintiff underwent a radical hysterectomy, which ren-
dered her sterile and impaired her sexual functioning."2 Al-
though she could not prove the identity of the maker of the
particular drug taken by her mother, she claimed that the defen-
dant should nevertheless be found liable. 3 She based her claim
on an expanded theory of concert of action, alleging that the de-
fendant was jointly and severally liable as one of the group of
7. See Comment, Market Share Liability Adopted to Overcome Defendant Identifi-
cation Requirements in DES Litigation, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 571, 572 & n.10 (1981); See
also Comment, supra note 6, at 972.
8. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 41.
9. Cases in which drug companies prevailed on the basis of plaintiffs' failure to iden-
tify the manufacturer of the actual product which caused their injuries include: Ryan v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D.S.C. 1981)(partial summary judgment); Gray
v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87
Cal. App. 2d 77, 84, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 735 (1978); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178
N.J. Super. 19, 27, 427 A.2d 1121, 1125 (1981).
10. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
778. Plaintiff originally joined as defendant the pharmacist who had supplied the medi-
cation to her mother. On motion by the pharmacist, the court dismissed the claim
against him. Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 336, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57, 60 (1st Dep't 1977).
When Bichler is used in this paper it will refer to Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., not to
Bichler v. Willing.
11. Since plaintiff was an infant, she had three years after her majority to bring her
action in negligence or strict liability. For a general discussion of the problem of when
the cause of action accrues, see Comment, supra note 6, at 970, n.23.
12. 79 A.D.2d at 319, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
13. Id. A bifurcated trial was held at Lilly's request, with the first trial devoted to
the issue of manufacturer identification. The jury found that plaintiff had not estab-
lished that defendant was the manufacturer of the pills taken by her mother. Id.
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DES manufacturers who had wrongfully tested and marketed
the drug for use in pregnancy."' She asserted that the wrongful
conduct of each company evidenced either the tacit agreement
with or substantial encouragement of the others' conduct neces-
sary to supply the requisite showing of concerted action.15 The
jury found that even though plaintiff had failed to establish that
the defendant was the manufacturer of the DES taken by her
mother, the defendant had engaged in concerted action with
other manufactuers and could therefore be held liable for her
damages." The appellate court upheld the verdict, finding am-
ple evidence from which a jury could determine that defendant
had engaged in concerted action. 7 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that the trial court's instructions on concerted
action liability were not erroneous and that the evidence before
the jury was legally sufficient to support a verdict based on con-
certed action.18
In allowing plaintiff to bring her claim against the specifi-
cally unidentified manufacturer, New York became one of the
few jurisdictions to sustain such actions when the cause in fact
requirement has not been met.19 Each of these jurisdictions,
however, has relied on a different basis on which to predicate
liability.2 This note examines the theory adopted in Bichler and
14. Plaintiff contended that the drug companies should have tested the effects of
the drug on the offspring of pregnant mice and that two-generation testing was within
scientific knowledge at the time. Id. at 322-24, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629-30.
15. Id. at 320, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628. See Amended Complaint, Record, vol. 1 at 45a.
See supra note 4 for a definition of concerted action.
16. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
17. Id.
18. 55 N.Y.2d at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 183, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
19. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94
Mich. App. 59, 76, 289 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1979); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super.
551, 566-67, 420 A.2d 1305, 1312-13 (1980). The Ferrigno court extended the holding of
Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 302, 338 A.2d 17 (1975), to the DES situation. The
court stated that "where a plaintiff, through no fault of his own, was not able to identify
precisely who harmed him although he could say it was one member of a group, it was
appropriate to shift the burden of proof." Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. at
566, 420 A.2d at 1312. The Ferrigno court's reading of Anderson was, however, rejected
in Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. at 32 n.3, 427 A.2d at 1127 n.3.
20. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (liability grounded on a modified alter-
native liability theory called market share liability); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich.
1982]
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compares it with those used in other jurisdictions. It concludes
that the use of the concert of action theory as expanded in
Bichler operates to impose a species of enterprise or industry-
wide liability on the DES manufacturers.2 1
II. Background
A. The Development of DES
DES, or diethylstilbestrol, is a synthetic estrogen first devel-
oped in England in 1938.22 Because its makers did not patent
the drug,2" it could be made and sold by any number of manu-
facturers under its generic name.2" In 1939, several American
manufacturers sought Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ap-
proval to market DES, proposing its use for a variety of estrogen
disorders in women.23 The first applications were rejected by the
FDA because they were based solely on foreign studies.2 6 At the
FDA's suggestion, the companies joined together to pool their
clinical data on the drug in order to expedite the approval pro-
cess by a joint filing.2 7 They also agreed to follow a uniform
chemical formula and to use uniform labeling and product liter-
ature.2 8 Initial FDA approval in 1941 did not include the use of
DES to prevent miscarriage.2 Supplemental applications for
that use, first filed in 1947, were based primarily on two studies
App. 59, 76, 289 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1979) (plaintiffs allowed to proceed on the traditional,
unmodified theories of alternative liability and concert of action).
21. The term "enterprise liability" is often used in an economic context in reference
to spreading the cost of risk. See Klimas v. ITT, 297 F. Supp. 937, 941 n.4 (D.R.I. 1969).
For this reason, one commentator suggests using the term "industry-wide liability" in
the legal context. Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 983 (1979).
22. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628. Except as
otherwise noted, the facts presented are drawn from the appellate division opinion. For
an extensive account of DES's development, see Comment, supra note 6, at 963-65 &
nn.1-10 For a more recent discussion, which recounts the role of the FDA in the approval
process, see Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1032-34 (D. Mass. 1981).
23. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
24. Id. at 319, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
25. Id. at 321-22, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
26. Id. at 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
27. Id.
28. Id. Defendant Lilly was one of the original twelve companies, together known as
the "Small Committee," which filed jointly. Lilly's literature provided the model for the
package inserts used by the companies. Id.
29. Id. at 321-22, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
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which were soon shown to be suspect for inadequate controls
and unsubstantiated claims.30 Nevertheless, FDA approval was
granted. Serious questions regarding the efficacy and potential
carcinogenic effect of DES existed before FDA approval and
multiplied afterward, but at no time did the companies perform
tests on laboratory animals to determine the possible effects of
the drug on the human fetus.31 After medical studies later re-
vealed a link between maternal use of DES and subsequent de-
velopment of vaginal cancer in daughters, the FDA in 1971 con-
traindicated the use of DES in pregnancy.3 2
Between 1947, when the FDA first approved the use of DES
for preventing miscarriage, and 1971, when such use was discon-
tinued, several hundred companies were involved in the manu-
facture and marketing of the drug.33 During that period, possibly
two million women took DES in the larger doses prescribed for
prevention of miscarriage." Years later, their daughters, exposed
in utero, were discovered to have developed precancerous and
cancerous vaginal tract abnormalities related to the use of the
drug.35 Discovery of the link led to an estimated one thousand
suits being filed by DES victims,"' with most suits still pending
at the pre-trial stages.37
30. Id. at 322 n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29 n.2.
31. Id. at 324, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630. One of the studies cited in Lilly's supplemental
application raised specific questions about possible carcinogenic effects on pregnant wo-
men and possible glandular imbalance in the fetus caused by the large doses of DES
used to prevent miscarriage. Id. at 323, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629. Scientists knew in 1947 that
drugs given to a pregnant woman passed through the placental barrier and could affect
the growing fetus. Id.
32. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 577, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
778.
33. Estimates of the number of companies involved in the manufacture of DES vary
from 94 to 300. Comment, supra note 6, at 964 n.3. The court in Payton v. Abbott Labo-
ratories noted that 10 firms were involved in 1941, 71 firms in 1947, 151 in 1957, and 91
in 1967. Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F. Supp. at 1034.
34. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 16, col. 2. The drug continues to be used at lower
doses for other disorders. Id.
35. Recent studies indicate that males exposed prenatally to DES may also have
been affected. See, e.g., Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation
Problem, 94 HAuv. L. REv. 668, 669 n.8 (1981).
36. Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A. J. 827 (1980).
37. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597, 607 P.2d 924, 927, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 135, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The California Supreme Court noted
that, at the time of its decision, all but two of the cases that had been decided had
resulted in judgments in favor of the drug companies, solely on the basis of the failure of
1982]
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B. The Identification Problem in DES Litigation
DES plaintiffs face considerable problems of proof,38 but
the most significant problem thus far has been how to overcome
the threshold requirement of identifying the defendant as the
manufacturer of the product which is the cause in fact of their
injury. 9 Proof of cause in fact is a fundamental requirement of
an action in tort,40 and implicit in the requirement is the neces-
sity of identifying the defendant as the actual tortfeasor.41 Most
plaintiffs to identify the manufacturers of the DES taken by their mothers. The two
exceptions were Bichler and Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20
(1979).
38. In any products liability case, the plaintiff must prove three elements. First, that
he was injured by the product. Second, that the injury occurred because the product was
unsafe. Last, that the danger or defect existed when the product left the hands of the
defendant. W. PROSSER, supra note 4 at § 103.
39. See 1 PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) § 11.01[4] (1981); See also I R. HURSH & S. BAI-
LEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:41 (2d ed. 1974); 63 AM. JuR. 2d Products
Liability § 5 (1972).
A number of commentators have addressed the DES identification problem. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 6; Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981); Note, Proof of Causation in Multi-
party Drug Litigation, 56 TEx. L. REV. 125 (1977); Note A Remedy for the "DES
Daughters": Products Liability Without the Identification Requirement, 42 U. PITT. L.
REV. 669 (1981); Note, Industry-Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of the Missing
Manufacturer in Products Liability Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139 (1981). See also
Annot., 51 A.L.R. 3d 1344 (1973) (a general discussion of the problem of identifying the
manufacturers of defective products).
40. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 41.
41. Id. Prosser notes that the proof required of a plaintiff seeking to recover for
injuries from an unsafe product is largely the same whether the suit rests on negligence,
warranty, or strict liability in tort. On any of these bases, plaintiff has the initial burden
of proof that the defect which resulted in his injury existed when the product left the
hands of the particular defendant. Id. § 103. See supra note 38. There are many cases
where plaintiff's failure to identify defendant as the manufacturer of the defective prod-
uct was fatal to recovery. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973)
(summary judgment for defendant manufacturer granted where impossible to identify
which of two manufacturers had supplied defective component); Garcia v. Joseph Vince
Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978) (judgment of nonsuit affirmed where
evidence was equally divided as to which of two sabre manufacturers supplied defective
blade); Kinsey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 137 Ga. App. 681, 225 S.E.2d 96 (1976) (di-
rected verdict for defendant held proper where store from which plaintiff had purchased
bottle, although within defendant's distribution area, also obtained bottles from other
areas and where there was no proof that the defective bottle was manufactured and sold
by defendant); Shanks v. Oneita Knitting Mills, 58 A.D.2d 741, 395 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1977)
(summary judgment affirmed where there was no evidence that defendant had manufac-
tured the T-shirt in question). For a more complete collection of cases, see 1 R. HURSH &
S. BAILEY, supra note 39, at §§ 1:41-43 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1981).
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DES plaintiffs are unable to determine the identity of the maker
of the product used by their mothers, because of two factors be-
yond their control.42 First, the generic nature of the drug makes
its manufacturer extremely difficult to trace, and second, in
most cases considerable time has passed since ingestion, so that
crucial medical and pharmaceutical records have long since been
lost or destroyed. The lack of proof of identification leaves the
plaintiff open to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or
motions for summary judgment." Until very recently, this iden-
tification requirement acted as an effective bar to recovery in
most DES cases."
To defeat this identification problem, plaintiffs have sought
to impose joint and several liability on every DES manufac-
turer.45 In the few cases where plaintiffs have been successful,
two theories have emerged as means by which the identification
barrier may be circumvented: concerted action, and alternative
liability."
The ancient doctrine of concerted action 47 is employed
when two or more parties are alleged to have acted in pursuance
of a common plan to commit a tortious act.48 Each participant
can be held liable for the damage done by his co-participants,
even though his own acts have not caused the injury.49 Express
42. See Comment, Market Share Liability Adopted to Overcome Defendant Identi-
fication Requirement in DES Litigation, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 571, 572 & n.10 (1981); see
also Comment, supra note 6, at 972.
43. See, e.g., Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 35, 427 A.2d
1121, 1129 (1981), where the New Jersey appellate court affirmed the granting of sum-
mary judgment as to all 44 defendants due to the lack of identification.
44. See cases cited supra note 9.
45. E.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 324-25, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630; Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 595, 607 P.2d 924, 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d
20, 22 (1979).
46. Comment, supra note 6, at 973. These theories derive from the law of joint
tortfeasors. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALF. L. REV. 413, 414
(1937).
47. In Sir John Heyden's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 6, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1151 (1613), the
court declared that "all coming together to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act
of one is the act of all of the same party being present."
48. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 46. See RmrATE1 JEwr (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876
(1977).
49. See Comment, supra note 6 at 978-79. The doctrine seems to have evolved to
deter anti-social activity rather than to solve cause in fact problems of identity; id. at
1982]
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agreement to pursue the plan is not necessary; a tacit under-
standing is enough. 0 The classic illustration of this doctrine is
the case where two or more cars participate in a spontaneous
drag race, and one car injures a bystander. Each driver will be
considered jointly and severally liable for that injury, although
only one car actually struck the plaintiff.8 1 The element of tacit
agreement necessary to prove such liability may be inferred from
the parallel conduct of the participants.2
The theory of alternative liability applies in situations
where each defendant, acting independently, has behaved tor-
tiously, but only one unidentifiable defendant actually caused
the injury. 3 The theory originated in the case of Summers v.
Tice." There, plaintiff's two hunting companions fired their
guns carelessly in his direction. 8 Although only one bullet in-
jured plaintiff, it was impossible to determine from whose gun it
was fired .5 The court considered the application of the concert
of action theory, but refused to strain the concept since an infer-
ence of tacit agreement to pursue a common plan would be an
obvious fiction in this case. 7 Instead, the court allowed the bur-
den of proof of causation to be shifted to the defendants on the
grounds of fairness to the injured party. Since both defendants
979 & n. 71; cf. Hall v. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 435 F. Supp. 353, 371 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 46.
51. The doctrine has been used in New York since horse and buggy days. See, e.g.,
De Carvalho v. Brunner, 223 N.Y. 284, 119 N.E. 563 (1918). For a more recent discus-
sion, see Finn v. Morgan, 46 A.D.2d 229, 362 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1974). The Finn court ruled
that, if, on retrial, the jury determined that the defendant was participating in a race at
the time of the accident, he would be guilty of negligence causing injury to plaintiff
although his vehicle was not directly involved in the collision. In such a situation, "par-
ticipation in the race was the equivalent of participation in the accident." Id. at 232, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 297. To establish such participation, the court noted, the facts must support
an inference of some agreement to race, such as a challenge, answered by a change in
speed and position. Id. at 232, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98.
For a collection of cases from other jurisdictions, see Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 431
(1967).
52. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 46 at 292.
53. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 41. Prosser calls the doctrine "double fault
and alternative liability." Id.
54. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
55. Id. at 82-83, 199 P.2d at 2.
56. Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 2.
57. Id. at 85-86, 199 P.2d at 3-4.
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were wrongdoers, and since it was their conduct that had placed
plaintiff in the unfair position of having to prove the cause of his
injury, the court determined that shifting the burden was justi-
fied.5 8 Rather than leave plaintiff remediless, policy reasons
compelled the court to hold each defendant jointly and severally
liable if he could not exculpate himself.59 This theory has tradi-
tionally been available only when plaintiff has joined all possible
tortfeasors.60
Both theories were successfully asserted in a Michigan DES
case, Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,61 where plaintiff joined as defen-
dants all manufacturers who had distributed DES in the area
during the time the drug had been prescribed to her mother.
The Michigan Court of Appeals,62 in refusing to grant defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment, held that plaintiff's alle-
gations that defendants had acted in concert to produce and
market ineffective and dangerous products, without adequate
testing or warning, were sufficient to state a cause of action."
The court also permitted a reliance on the alternative liability
theory, noting that in special circumstances "policy and fair-
ness" dictate a shifting of the burden to the wrongdoer."
The unmodified use of the alternative liability theory was
58. Id.
59. Id. Summers v. Tice is codified at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)
(1965). According to the Restatement, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants only
if the plaintiff can demonstrate that all defendants acted tortiously and that the harm
resulted from the conduct of one of them. Id. § 433b(3) comment g.
60. Id. § 43B(3) comment h. Although the rule has traditionally been applied only
when all actors are joined as defendants and where the conduct of all was simultaneous,
the comment notes that cases might arise in which some modification of the rule would
be necessary because "one of the actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a defen-
dant, or because of the effect of the lapse of time. . . . The rule stated in Subsection (3)
is not intended to preclude possible modification if such situations call for it." Id. No
New York cases relying on Summers have been found. But see Thrower v. Smith, 62
A.D.2d 907, 913, 406 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1978). In Thrower, the dissent recognizes that
the Summers v. Tice rationale is generally accepted. Id. at 920, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 521; the
majority does not comment upon this view because the case is distinguishable from Sum-
mers and deals primarily with an evidentiary question. See also the discussion of Hall v.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
61. 94 Mich. App. 59, 71-72, 289 N.W.2d 20, 24 (1979).
62. Id. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
63. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 24-25.
64. Id. at 75-76, 289 N.W.2d at 26.
1982]
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rejected by the California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,5 where plaintiff had not joined every possible
manufacturer." The Court stated that unless all were joined,
there would be no basis for inferring that the product of any one
defendant was the cause in fact.6 7 The Sindell court also re-
jected the concerted action theory" because the requisite ele-
ment of implied agreement was not, in that court's opinion, sup-
plied by a showing of conscious parallel conduct by the
manufacturers." The court reasoned that stretching the doctrine
to encompass a common industry practice would not only go far
beyond the intended scope of the doctrine, but would hold virtu-
ally any manufacturer liable for the defective products of an en-
tire industry, even if the defendant could prove that his product
was not the cause in fact of the injury.70 Although it rejected the
traditional doctrines, the Sindell court felt compelled by reasons
of policy and fairness to find a basis for allowing the claim.7
Recalling Justice Traynor's famous concurrence in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.,72 the court reaffirmed its rejection of a
rigid adherence to traditional tort law in the fact of the complex
problems created by modern technology.73 When fungible goods
which harm consumers cannot be traced to any specific pro-
ducer, the Sindell court noted, "some adaptation of the rules of
causation and liability may be appropriate . . . .,, The court
chose to modify the Summers theory of alternative liability by
65. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
66. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39. But cf. supra note 60.
67. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
68. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
69. Id. The court's reasoning echoes its earlier refusal in Summers to stretch the
concert of action theory. See supra text accompanying note 57.
70. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 141.
71. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
72. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 433 (1944). Urging the adoption of a strict
liability standard, Justice Traynor in his concurrence said, "The manufacturer's obliga-
tion to the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationships between them; it
cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has become so complicated.
24 Cal. 2d at 467, 150 P.2d at 443.
73. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 2d 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
144.
74. Id.
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permitting an action when a substantial number of the manufac-
turers were joined as defendants.75 Each manufacturer, however,
would be liable only for its proportionate "market share" of the
judgment.76 Further, each defendant would also have the oppor-
tunity to fully exculpate itself by proving that it did not manu-
facture the product which actually caused the injury."
III. Bichler v. Lilly: The Lower Court Decision
The issue presented in the Bichler case was whether an in-
jured plaintiff who cannot identify the actual manufacturer of
the drug which caused her injury, and thus cannot satisfy the
traditional tort requirement of showing cause in fact, may im-
pose joint and several liability on a single DES manufacturers.7
75. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
76. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court, in its discussion of
"market share" liability, cites directly to the Comment, supra note 6, at 996. Id. This
acknowledgement is significant, since the court is in effect adopting an element of the
Comment's suggested theory of enterprise liability. Enterprise liability, also referred to
as "industry-wide" liability, is a hybrid theory, combining elements of both concert of
action and alternative liability. See supra note 21. First suggested by a federal district
court in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (1972), the theory
was fully developed in the Comment, where the following elements are suggested in addi-
tion to market share apportionment of liability:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent and such
liability is due to the nature of defendant's conduct.
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the defendants.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused by the
product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants ac-
counted for a high percentage of such defective products on the market at the
time of plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industrywide standard of safety as to the manu-
facture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whichever cause
of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict liability.
Comment, supra note 6, at 995. Once plaintiff proves these elements, the burden of prov-
ing causation shifts to the defendants, any of whom may individually exculpate himself
by showing that his product could not have injured plaintiff. Id. Although the theory has
yet to be openly adopted by any court, it clearly influenced the Sindell and Bichler
courts in their modifications of traditional theories.
77. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 145.
78. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 324, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630. The court
noted that plaintiff's inability to identify the manufacturer was through no fault of her
own, but rather as a result of the industry practices in marketing and distribution of
11
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A unanimous New York appellate division court, adopting an
expanded concert of action theory, held that, in the "special cir-
cumstances" of the DES cases, joint and several liability could
be imposed without proof of identity as an element of cause in
fact.7 9 The court cited several factors in support of its holding.
First, the court found sufficient evidence to justify the jury find-
ing that the defendant and the other manufacturers of DES had
wrongfully tested and marketed the drug." Reservations about
the efficacy of DES for treatment of complications of pregnancy,
doubts about the adequacy of the two studies relied on,8 1 and
concerns about the potential carcinogenic effect of the drug on
mother and fetus were shown to have all been raised prior to
1953, when plaintiff's mother used DES.8 Yet none of the com-
panies producing or marketing DES responded to these issues
by performing any tests on either humans or animals.83 The
court also found that the evidence of "conscious parallel activ-
ity" by the drug companies amply supported an inference of a
tacit understanding among the companies to wrongfully market
the drug for use in preventing miscarriage without first perform-
ing laboratory tests upon pregnant mice." The original coopera-
tion and pooling of data by the first twelve applicants set the
pattern for later manufacturers, who used the same basic chemi-
cal formula and literature. When FDA approval was later sought
for the use of DES in pregnancy, the companies relied on the
same research studies and prescribed the same dosages. On
these facts, the court found "ample evidence" of concerted
action. 85
The court admitted that it was doing what the Sindel court
had found unacceptable: it was stretching concert of action to
encompass the common practice of an entire industry by al-
drugs. Id.
79. Id. at 328, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
80. Id. at 333, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The jury was specifically asked whether a rea-
sonably prudent DES manufacturer, given the state of scientific knowledge, should have
foreseen that DES use by a pregnant user might cause cancer in offspring, and if so,
whether a prudent manufacturer would have tested DES on pregnant mice. Id.
81. Id. at 322 n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628 n.2.
82. Id. at 322, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
83. Id. at 324, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
84. Id. at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
85. Id.
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lowing "conscious parallelism" to evidence the required element
of tacit agreement.86 The Bichler court, however, characterized
this as only a "limited -expansion" of the doctrine, justified by
both legal precedent and equitable considerations.8 7
As legal precedent, the court pointed to a previous tailoring
of the doctrine in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co." In
Hall, plaintiffs were children injured in separate blasting cap ex-
plosions. Unable to identify the manufacturers of the product
which caused their injuries, they joined six manufacturers, who
comprised virtually the entire domestic industry.8 9 The court, in
Bichler, noted that Hall had fashioned a theory which combined
elements of concerted action and alternative liability.90 Con-
certed action was shown both by express agreement among the
defendant blasting-cap manufacturers not to warn of their prod-
uct's danger, 91 and by the companies' reliance on industry-wide
safety standards.92 The alternative liability doctrine was invoked
to allow a shifting of the burden of proof of causation to the
defendants, permitting them to exculpate themselves if they
could show that their product did not cause the injury.93 As fur-
ther support for its theory the court pointed to the fact that
"conscious parallel behavior" without express agreement had
long been accepted by the Supreme Court as a basis for finding
conspiracy in antitrust cases.94
In addition to the legal justifications cited, the court also
emphasized the policy considerations which mandated expan-
sion of traditional doctrines "to adapt to the exigencies of trying
a case in the rapidly developing area of the law of strict products
liability."9 The complexity of modern products, the court noted,
86. Id. at 326-27, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
87. Id. at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
88. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See supra note 76 for a discussion of Hall's
contribution to the theory of industry-wide liability.
89. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. at 359.
90. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
93. Id. at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
94. Id. at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
95. Id. at 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630-31. New York adopted its version of strict prod-
ucts liability in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
(1973):
[U]nder a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a defective
19821
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often means that the manufacturer is the only party who can
know if the product is safe. 6 The court refused to allow such a
manufacturer to escape liability by hiding behind the "shroud of
anonymity" created by the generic nature of his product and the
parallel practices of his industry. Citing Abel'7 and Sindell" as
examples of the responses by other courts to the "special cir-
cumstances" facing the DES plaintiffs, the New York Appellate
Division joined the Michigan and California courts in refusing to
bar an otherwise valid claim when the traditional requirement of
causation was impossible to prove. 99
The court found no unfairness in imposing liability on the
sole defendant. 100 Plaintiff had the option of going against any
joint tortfeasor; as a participant in concerted tortious action, de-
fendant was jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, defendant
could proceed against the other manufacturers for contribution
under the theory of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,101 which allows
allocation of the judgment according to equitable share.102
product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial
factor in bringing about his injury or damages; provided:
(1) that at the time of the occurrence the product is being used (whether by
the person injured or damaged or by a third person) for the purpose and in the
manner normally intended,
(2) that if the person injured or damaged is himself the user of the product he
would not by the exercise of reasonable care have both discovered the defect and
perceived its danger, and
(3) that by the exercise of reasonable care the person injured or damaged
would not otherwise have averted his injury or damages.
Id. at 343, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29. 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
96. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 328-39, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
97. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
98. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
99. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
100. Id. at 331, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 634. Eli Lilly & Co., unsuccessfully protested its
being singled out for liability in light of testimony by Mrs. Bichler's pharmacist that he
stocked DES manufactured by four or five producers. Id.
101. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co. has been codified in N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1976).
102. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d
at 387.
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IV. The Court of Appeals Decision
A. The Decision
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
lower-court ruling. 03 The opinion was so narrowly drawn, how-
ever, as to leave undefined the scope of the expanded concerted
action theory. Limiting itself only to those issues preserved for
its review, 04 the court held that the trial court's instructions on
the concerted action theory were "not erroneous as a matter of
law," and that the jury's verdict in light of those instructions
was not without sufficient evidentiary support.'
The court refused to address Lilly's claim on appeal that it
was "jurisprudentially unsound" to permit recovery against it on
a concerted action theory.0 6 Noting that Lilly had not raised
this claim at any prior stage of the proceedings, the court held
that the theory of concerted action therefore became the "con-
trolling law" of the case. 0 7 Having made this determination, it
103. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776
(1982).
104. Id. at 576, 436 N.E.2d at 183, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 777. The New York Court of
Appeals has narrower powers of review than the appellate division. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 5501 (a)(3) (McKinney 1978), which provides that an appeals court may
review "any charge to the jury, or failure or refusal to charge as requested by the appel-
lant, to which he objected." If proper objection is not made, the appellate division may
nevertheless reverse a judgment and grant a new trial on the basis of error which it
deems fundamental; the court of appeals, however, may not do so, nor may it review the
appellate division's exercise of such discretion. See, e.g., Jeminson v. Goodman, 49
A.D.2d 1011, 1012, 373 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (4th Dep't 1975); 7 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN &
A. MILLER, N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE 1 5501.11 (1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5501, commen-
tary at 21 (McKinney 1978). See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
105. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 576, 436 N.E.2d at 183, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
777.
106. Id. at 581, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 780. The court noted that mo-
tions appropriate to this claim, such as a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action, or a motion to join other manufacturers as necessary parties, were
never made by Lilly, nor was the issue raised in the motions Lilly did make. Id.
107. Id. The doctrine of the "law of the case" refers to a judicial determination
made in a prior stage of an action which becomes controlling; its purpose is to prevent
relitigation of issues. See generally D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 448 (1978), where
the doctrine is described as "a kind of intra-action res judicata." Although the doctrine
has been invoked where an erroneous charge was not objected to and thus was consid-
ered the law of the case, e.g., Olsen v. Saint Margaret of Scotland Roman Catholic
Church, 21 A.D.2d 827, 828, 251 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (2d Dep't 1964), the line of cases so
holding have been discredited by Martin v. City of Cohoes, 37 N.Y.2d 162, 332 N.E.2d
867, 371 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1975), which expressly limited the doctrine to issues which were
15
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only remained for the court to decide whether, to the extent the
issue was preserved,108 the trial court's instructions on concerted
action were erroneous,109 and if not, whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict. 110
The court first considered the trial court's instructions to
the jury on concerted action.1 The instructions specified two
theories of concerted action upon which defendant's liability
could be premised: first, concerted action by agreement, in
which an express or implied understanding is manifested by
"consciously parallel conduct" on the part of the drug compa-
nies in failing to test DES on pregnant mice; and, second, con-
certed action by substantial assistance, in which the companies
acted independently of each other in failing to test but with the
result that such independent actions had the effect of substan-
tially encouraging the failure to test by the others.1 Although
the court enumerated Lilly's challenges to these instructions, 1 i
it refused to explore the merits of Lilly's claims, holding that
such exploration was precluded by the fact that none of the
challenges had been preserved for review by appropriate request
of exception.1" ' The sole exception to the concerted action
charge which Lilly had made concerned the issue of intent,113 an
"judicially determined." Id. at 165, 332 N.E.2d at 869, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 689. See gener-
ally 7 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, supra note 104,1 5501.10; Julien, The Law of
the Case, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1982 at 1, col. 1; Note, Successive Appeals and the Law of
the Case, 62 HARV. L. REV. 286 (1948).
108. See supra note 104.
109. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d at 581, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 780.
110. Id. at 584, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
111. Id. at 581-82, 436 N.E.2d at 186-87, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 582, 436 N.E.2d at 187, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 781. In its appeal, Lilly ad-
dressed the two branches of the charge separately. With respect to concerted action by
agreement, Lilly contended that the jury should have been instructed that (1) direct
evidence was needed in addition to conscious parallelism to support a finding of agree-
ment; (2) every drug company whose product might have been the one taken by plain-
tiff's mother had to be a party to the agreement; and (3) the agreement had to concern
either affirmative commission of a negligent act or intentional omission of a nonact. With
respect to concerted action by substantial assistance, Lilly contended that (1) a finding
of agreement was necessary; and (2) Lilly itself must have injured plaintiff. Lilly also
contended that the court did not adequately define "substantial assistance." Id.
114. Id. at 583, 436 N.E.2d at 187, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
115. Id.
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issue which the court stated did not "even arguably relate" to
any of the claimed errors urged on appeal." 6 Without proper ob-
jection having been taken, the trial court's charge on concerted
action therefore became the law of the case. 1 7
The court then addressed the issue of whether the evidence
was legally sufficient to support the jury's finding of concerted
action, either by agreement or by substantial assistance."' With
regard to concerted action by agreement, the court held that the
jury could infer, solely from evidence of "consciously parallel be-
havior," an implied agreement by the drug companies not to test
DES on pregnant mice." 9 Similarly, the court found that the
charge on concerted action by substantial agreement allowed the
jury to infer from Lilly's failure to test that other manufacturers
were substantially encouraged to do the same. 20 Confining its
review of the evidence to events beginning in 1947,121 the court
held that the conduct of Lilly and the other companies in filing
new drug applications for use of DES for treatment of problems
of pregnancy "was sufficient to support jury findings of both
conscious parallelism and substantial assistance or encourage-
ment under the jury instructions to which no exception was
taken."122
B. Analysis of the Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals decision, characterized by a deliberate
emphasis on the procedural aspects of the appeal and a corre-
sponding narrowness in the scope of its review, provides little
116. Id. at 584, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
117. Id. See supra note 107 for a discussion of the "law of the case" doctrine.
118. Id. Because it was impossible to determine upon which theory - concerted
action by agreement or concerted action by substantial assistance - the jury had relied,
the court needed to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support recovery under
either theory. Id. See Davis v. Caldwell, 54 N.Y.2d 176, 179-80, 429 N.E.2d 741, 743, 445
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1981).
119. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 584, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
782.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 585, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
122. Id. The court held, with respect to the two remaining issues raised by Lilly,
that (1) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that cancer in the offspring was a
foreseeable risk of prenatal DES exposure; and (2) that plaintiff's theory of liability did
not necessitate a jury charge as to Lilly's duty to warn. Id. at 585-87, 436 N.E.2d at 189-
90, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783-84.
1982]
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guidance as to the acceptability of the concerted action theory.
After stating positively that "[p]roducts liability law cannot be
expected to stand still where innocent victims face inordinately
difficult problems of proof, ' 123 the court avoided every opportu-
nity to set forth a clear rule on concerted action. Further, the
court refused to consider, even in passing, the other theories of
liability proposed for application in the DES cases; 2 4 instead,
the court stated that it was expressly leaving "for another day
consideration of whether other theories of liability may in the
DES context establish a cause of action."'25 Announcing that it
would address only the basis of liability pleaded, concerted ac-
tion, the court further narrowed its review of that basis only "to
the extent that the issue was preserved for our review. "126
Throughout the decision, the court repeatedly emphasized
the limited nature of its scrutiny. First, although it allowed con-
certed action to form the basis of a full recovery against Lilly, it
did so almost grudgingly, giving as its only reason the fact that
Lilly had allowed the case to proceed on that basis.127 Further-
more, it considered the trial court's instructions with regard to
concerted action only in light of whether proper exception had
been taken; by this test, it found them to be "not erroneous as a
matter of law,"' 12' hardly an enthusiastic endorsement. Finally,
in its review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the court found
the evidence to be sufficient, but emphasized that it had only
measured the sufficiency under the "jury instructions to which
no exception was taken.' 2 9
The penurious nature of the court's endorsement of the con-
certed action theory may have a purely procedural explanation.
Section 5501 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules pro-
vides that an appeal brings up for review "any charge to the
123. Id. at 579-80, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (quoting Caprara v.
Chrysler, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981)).
124. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 580, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
780. See supra notes 45-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of theories of liability
proposed for use in the DES context.
125. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 580, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
780.
126. Id. at 576, 436 N.E.2d at 183, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
127. Id. at 581, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
128. Id. at 576, 436 N.E.2d at 183, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
129. Id. at 585, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
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jury, or failure or refusal to charge as requested by the appel-
lant, to which he objected."1 0 Section 4017 further provides that
"[f]ailure to. . . make known objections. . . may restrict review
upon appeal . ". . . I" The court of appeals, struggling with a
huge caseload,13 2 cannot be expected to knowingly expand its
scope of review to embrace issues not properly raised on appeal.
Although the precedential value of the court of appeals de-
cision in Bichler remains open to question, there are oblique in-
dications in the opinion which suggest that New York will re-
main a sympathetic forum for a DES plaintiff who relies on the
concerted action theory. First, the court's express declaration
that "[p]roducts liability law cannot be expected to stand still
where innocent victims face inordinately difficult problems of
proof"' 3 indicates the court's willingness to entertain new theo-
ries or, as in Bichler, new applications of old theories."' Fur-
thermore, the court found that there was sufficient evidence of
conscious parallelism among the first group of companies who
sought approval of the use of DES for problems of pregnancy in
1947 and 1948, basing its finding on the facts that the companies
filed their applications within a short span of time, relied on the
same studies, and requested approval for the same dosages.3
Moreover, the court found that Lilly's participation in this first
wave of filings could fairly be found by the jury to substantially
encourage the other companies who subsequently manufactured
130. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5501(a)(3) (McKinney 1978). See supra note 104.
131. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4017 (McKinney Supp. 1981). See Guaspari v. Gorsky,
29 N.Y.2d 891, 891-92, 278 N.E.2d 913, 914, 328 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1972); Miles v. R. &
M. Appliance Sales, 26 N.Y.2d 451, 454, 259 N.E.2d 913, 916, 311 N.Y.S.2d 491, 494
(1970).
132. Margolick, Top State Court Is Called Unable to Perform Role, N.Y. Times,
July 30, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
133. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 579-80, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 779 (quoting Caprara v. Chrysler, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981)).
134. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
135. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 585, 436 N.E.2d at 188-89; 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 782-83. The appellate division had relied on the conduct of the manufacturers over
the period of time beginning with the initial filings in 1939. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 321-22, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628. Contra, e.g., Morton v. Abbott Labo-
ratories, 538 F. Supp. 593, 597-98 (summary judgment granted on a finding of no con-
certed activity in the 1947 filings).
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and marketed DES for the same purpose in 1953,36 the year the
drug was ingested by plaintiff's mother.1
3 7
C. Analysis of Ramifications of Bichler
The precedential value of the use of the concerted action
theory in DES cases must remain unclear. Until the court of ap-
peals deals with a case in which the issues have been fully pre-
served for its examination, its endorsement of the theory is
questionable. Nevertheless, its decision represents a significant
development in products liability law.
The most obvious result of this decision is that a New York
plaintiff, unlike her counterparts in California and Michigan,
need not join all or even most DES manufacturers; one defen-
dant is enough.13 8 This frees the New York plaintiff from the
necessity of serving out-of-state defendants or trying to assert
jurisdiction over them, and from the expensive, time-consuming
business of determining which of the hundreds of DES manufac-
turers might have supplied the relevant geographical area at the
time of ingestion. The defendant may be held liable for the en-
tire judgment even if it can prove that it did not manufacture
the particular product ingested. Further, a manufacturer who
made only one pill will be held fully liable.
At first glance, the Sindell court's shifting of the burden
and limiting the extent of liability to market share seem to lead
to a fairer result. The inequities which seem to result in Bichler
are not really meaningful, however, in light of the nature of con-
certed action liability. Unlike alternative liability, which holds
only one actor as truly culpable, under concerted action all the
participants in a wrongful activity are considered as culpable as
the actual producer of the product which inflicted the injury." O
In a sense, the wrongful activity becomes the cause in fact, so
that any participant in the activity is also a participant in the
136. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d at 585, 436 N.E.2d at 189, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
783.
137. Id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
138. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. The lone defendant may implead
other manufacturers at the outset rather than go against them for contribution after the
judgment. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1007 (McKinney 1976).
139. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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causation of the injury.14 ° On the practical level, the Sindell
shifting of the burden will likely prove a hollow victory for de-
fendants, since they face as insurmountable a problem in dis-
proving cause in fact as plaintiffs face in proving it.1 41
Aside from the arguably unfair placement of liability on one
manufacturer, the Bichler doctrine's most vulnerable element is
the nature of the showing required to prove tacit agreement.1 42
The conscious parallel activity of the drug companies is largely a
function of standard industry practice, and probably the inevita-
ble result of producing generically identical products. By holding
the entire industry liable on the basis of this parallel conduct,
the Bichler court is really endorsing a species of enterprise, or
industry-wide, liability.14 The court clearly feels that such ex-
tended liability is appropriate in certain circumstances, for
much the same reasons that justify imposing strict liability.
Since the manufacturer is often the only one who can know if a
product is safe for its intended use, it is fair to hold it strictly
liable, without proof of fault or privity. By the same reasoning, if
all the manufacturers in an industry negligently produce identi-
cal, and identically defective, products, it is fair to extend liabil-
ity across the whole industry. In adapting concerted action to
the DES situation, the Bichler court furthers the original two-
fold goals of the doctrine: to assure a deserving plaintiff of a
remedy, and to deter dangerous group behavior.4 By accepting
plaintiff's bold adoption of a little-used theory, 4 5 the Bichler
140. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
141. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 138.
142. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Birnbaum, DES Concert-of-
Action Theory: New Cases Bring New Confusion, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1981, at 31, col. 1,
col. 3.
143. See supra note 76. The court stops well short of imposing an industry-wide
strict liability. By predicating liability on concerted tortious action (the industry-wide
failure to test), the court preserves the element of fault which strict liability lacks. See
supra note 95.
144. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Goldstein, 51 Misc. 2d 825, 274 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1966), aff'd,
27 A.D.2d 955, 279 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1967), an action for assault, where plaintiff tried to
allege concert of action liability against defendant's wife, who had merely driven defen-
dant to and from the scene. The court, in wrestling with the elements of the concert of
action theory, remarked upon the "dearth of case law in this jurisdiction on the ques-
tion." Id. at 826, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
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court lifts the "shroud of anonymity"14 6 which had protected the
manufacturers of DES.
V. Conclusion
In Bichler, the New York courts responded to the identifica-
tion problem faced by the DES plaintiffs by allowing the concert
of action theory to establish joint and several liability on an in-
dustry-wide basis. The Bichler courts accepted a showing of par-
allel conduct in the drug manufacturers' testing and marketing
procedures as sufficient evidence of the tacit agreement element
of concerted action. A drug manufacturer who produces a ge-
neric product may thus be found liable even if his own product
did not cause the injury. To the extent that the lower court's
opinion was affirmed by the court of appeals, the decision repre-
sents a significant development in products liability law.
Andrea Riger Potash
146. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
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